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Sanctuary Cities and the Power of the 
Purse: An Executive Dole Test 
Douglas M. Spencer* 
ABSTRACT: A constitutional clash is brewing. Cities and counties are 
flexing their muscles to frustrate national immigration policy while the federal 
Executive is threatening to interfere with local law enforcement decision-
making and funding. Although the federal government generally has plenary 
authority over immigration law, the Constitution forbids the commandeering 
of state and local officials to enforce federal law against their will. One 
exception to this anti-commandeering principle is the Spending Clause of 
Article I that permits Congress to condition the receipt of federal funds on 
compliance with federal law. These conditions, according to more than 30 
years of Supreme Court precedent since South Dakota v. Dole, must be 
clearly articulated in advance, related to the underlying purpose of the federal 
funds, and not deemed coercive by the courts.  
The Attorney General recently announced conditions on federal law 
enforcement grants that would defund police departments who do not 
cooperate with federal immigration officials. These new funding conditions 
triggered legal challenges by a dozen jurisdictions under the Spending Clause. 
While the case law is clear that Congress may delegate its authority to add 
conditions on federal grants, two important questions remain unresolved:  
(1) does the authority to add conditions on spending inherently attach to 
delegations to implement federal grant programs or must that authority be 
delegated separately and unambiguously? and (2) are executive conditions 
subject to the same standards of clarity, germaneness, and non-coercion? 
Recent threats by President Trump to withhold funding for elections, 
education, and public parks amplify the need for clarity on these questions. 
In this Article, I argue that executive conditions on federal spending are 
unquestionably appropriate, but only when Congress has unambiguously 
delegated the authority to add conditions. This delegation should not act as 
 
 * Professor of Law & Public Policy at the University of Connecticut and Distinguished 
Faculty Fellow at the Byron R. White Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law at the 
University of Colorado (2020–2021). I am grateful to Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Anne Dailey, and 
Peter Siegelman for their helpful comments on previous drafts. I also want to thank Mary 
DeCamp of the Iowa Law Review for carefully reading multiple drafts and providing valuable 
feedback. 
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a loophole in the Dole doctrine. In fact, because the central constitutional 
concern in Spending Clause cases is the undue aggrandizement of federal 
power at the (literal) expense of the states, I argue that executive conditions 
on federal spending should be subject to stricter limits than conditions 
imposed by Congress; inter-branch coordination poses a greater threat to state 
sovereignty than either Congress or the Executive acting alone. The upshot  
of stricter executive limits is that conditions on federal spending will likely 
shift away from the Executive to Congress, which may be desirable on 
accountability grounds. 
Finally, the recent appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court have raised the stakes of this particular debate. Both of the 
new Justices have publicly articulated concerns about expanding federal 
power and federal administrative power in particular. The question of sua 
sponte executive conditions on federal grants-in-aid thus poses a ripe 
opportunity for skeptics of the administrative state to rein in the regulatory 
state while also narrowing the scope of the Spending Clause more generally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A constitutional clash is brewing. Law enforcement agencies in several 
dozen cities and more than one hundred counties nationwide have passed 
resolutions and/or endorsed policies and practices that limit cooperation 
with federal immigration officials.1 Many of these jurisdictions will simply not 
honor ICE detainers without a warrant or a judicial order despite federal law 
requiring cooperation with federal immigration authorities.2 These so-called 
sanctuary cities (and counties) argue that non-cooperation is necessary to 
build trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement, to reduce 
the chance of family break-ups, to avoid costly legal fees, to boost the economy 
and, ultimately, to preserve the peace.3 But there are political undertones as 
well. Sanctuary cities are flexing their muscles to signal displeasure with the 
Trump administration and to assert their authority as local sovereigns over 
their own law enforcement.4 This conflict between local and federal power  
 
 1. For a summary of policies enacted by sanctuary cities, see Christopher N. Lasch et al., 
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1736–52 (2018); Benjamin Gonzalez 
O’Brien, Loren Collingwood & Stephen Omar El-Khatib, The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, 
Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, 55 URB. AFFS. REV. 3, 8–9 (2019); and Jennifer Ridgley, 
Cities of Refuge: Immigration Enforcement, Police, and the Insurgent Genealogies of Citizenship in U.S. 
Sanctuary Cities, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 53, 65–72 (2008).  
 2. In February 2017, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement published a report 
pursuant to Executive Order 13,768 documenting 65 declined detainers by 32 detention centers 
during the week of Feb. 11, 2017 and 142 cities, towns, counties, and states that had publicly 
enacted or endorsed a non-cooperation policy with ICE since 2008. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS: WEEKLY DECLINED DETAINER OUTCOME 
REPORT FOR RECORDED DECLINED DETAINERS FEB 11–FEB 17, 2017, at 3, 10–23 (2017). Local 
authorities may not limit voluntary cooperative information sharing with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme law of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018) (“[A] local government entity or official may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving 
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”).  
 3. TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME 
AND THE ECONOMY 1 (2017) (“Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties 
compared to nonsanctuary counties. Moreover, economies are stronger in sanctuary counties 
—from higher median household income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance to 
higher labor force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower 
unemployment.”); see also Alexia Fernández Campbell, US Police Chiefs Are Fighting the Crackdown 
on “Sanctuary Cities,” VOX (Aug. 18, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 
2017/8/18/16130954/police-sanctuary-cities (“Police chiefs who oversee America’s largest law 
enforcement agencies unwaveringly assert that enforcing federal immigration laws is not their 
responsibility, and doing so would actually make their cities a lot more dangerous. . . . [Houston 
Police Chief Art] Acevedo and many of his colleagues want to make clear that separating 
immigration enforcement from police work is not about protecting undocumented immigrants, 
it’s about keeping cities safe.”). 
 4. See, e.g., John Hudak, Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Trump Threatened Sanctuary 
Cities, and They Shrugged—Here’s Why, BROOKINGS (May 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/fixgov/2019/05/01/trump-threatened-sanctuary-cities-and-they-shrugged-heres-why 
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is made possible because the federal government lacks the resources it needs 
to enforce its own laws. Instead, federal immigration officials rely on the 
cooperation of state and local law enforcement. This cooperation has its 
limits, however.5 The Constitution prevents Congress from commandeering 
state officials to enforce federal law against their will,6 but does permit 
Congress to incentivize cooperation through grant-in-aid programs.7 These 
programs offer financial inducements to state and local governments who 
voluntarily agree to their terms so long as the terms are clearly articulated in 
advance, related to the underlying purpose of the grant, and not coercive.8 
Just two weeks after his inauguration, President Donald Trump signed 
Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13,768 directing the Attorney General and 
Secretary of Homeland Security to withhold federal funding from sanctuary 
jurisdictions.9 Six months later the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive 
Order 13,768, added a set of immigration-related conditions to federal grants 
under the control of the Department of Justice.10 These “Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grants” (“Byrne JAG”) were created by Congress 
in 2005 as part of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act, which consolidated the preexisting Edward Byrne 
Memorial Formula Grant (created in 1988) and the Local Law Enforcement 
 
[https://perma.cc/AAB5-MNCC] (“Many of the mayors and governors who have declared 
sanctuary status for their jurisdictions, have effectively said ‘bring it on.’”). 
 5. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1258–59 (2009). 
 6. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“As an initial matter, Congress 
may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them 
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. 
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[L]ater opinions of ours have made clear that the Federal 
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal 
regulatory programs.”). 
 7. See Grants-in-Aid, CTR. FOR STUDY FEDERALISM, http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/ 
index.php/Grants-in-Aid [https://perma.cc/ZPR2-UTGJ] (“A grant-in-aid is the transfer of 
money from one level of government to another for a specific purpose and subject to substantive 
and procedural conditions found in the authorizing legislation and administrative regulations.”). 
 8. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). The Dole opinion highlights 
additional requirements for conditional grants, namely that they function to promote the general 
welfare and do not violate any constitutionally guaranteed rights or privileges (e.g., First 
Amendment rights, equal protection). See infra Part IV. 
 9. Exec. Order No. 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“It is the policy of the executive branch to . . . [e]nsure 
that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, 
except as mandated by law.”). 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.: Off. of Pub. Affs., Attorney General Sessions 
Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter Byrne JAG Press Release], https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-
edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/2SBG-95PR]. 
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Block Grant (created in 1996).11 The grants were named after a 22-year-old 
on-duty New York City police officer who was murdered while guarding the 
home of a cooperating witness in a drug trial.12 The Byrne JAG program is the 
largest source of federal funding to support local law enforcement, and its 
primary purpose is to give local jurisdictions flexibility to respond quickly to 
the changing needs of their local communities.13 
When the Attorney General added conditions on the Byrne JAG funds, 
he triggered legal challenges in federal courts in several states.14 According  
to the authorizing statute, the Attorney General is authorized to review grant 
applications from state and local governments,15 develop program assessment 
guidelines,16 and provide technical assistance to grantees.17 Nowhere is the 
Attorney General authorized to add substantive conditions or otherwise 
amend the eligibility requirements of the grant program. By imposing 
conditions on the Byrne JAG funds to “encourage . . . ‘sanctuary’ jurisdictions 
to change their policies,”18 the Attorney General raised a set of novel legal 
questions: Does the Spending Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution 
authorize the Executive and his agents to add conditions on federal 
appropriations? If so, what are the limits on this authority? The courts are just 
beginning to grapple with these questions. 
Every court that has so far considered the first question recognizes that 
the Spending Clause does not authorize the Executive to add conditions on 
congressionally-appropriated funding absent a delegation of that authority 
from Congress.19 However, lower courts are split about whether the Attorney 
General was acting pursuant to delegated authority when he conditioned 
Byrne JAG funds on cooperation with federal immigration agents. The First, 
 
 11. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22416, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 1–2 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22416.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4SB-JMUL]. 
 12. About Officer Byrne, BJA (Dec. 9, 2019), https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/about-officer-
byrne [https://perma.cc/4ND2-9U9F]. 
 13. NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF THE BYRNE JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT 
PROGRAM: HOW BYRNE JAG IS CHANGING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), https:// 
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/System-Change-Through-the-Byrne-JAG-Program-NCJA-10-13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3AE-B246] (“Byrne JAG’s hallmark is its flexibility. . . . Only when the 
criminal justice system is in balance can it function fairly, efficiently and cost effectively.”). 
 14. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 3d 748, 752–53 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff’d and 
remanded, 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2020); City of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 
934 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 
753 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W. 3172 (U.S. Nov. 19, 2020) (No. 20-666); 
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 951 
F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 590 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 15. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a) (2018). 
 16. Id. § 10152(c). 
 17. Id. § 10153(b). 
 18. Byrne JAG Press Release, supra note 10. 
 19. See infra Section III.C. 
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Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that he was not.20 On the other hand, 
the Second Circuit held that the delegated authority to review grant 
applications and develop assessment guidelines was sufficient to confer 
authority on the Executive to add discretionary conditions on the grants 
themselves.21 
On the question of the Executive’s discretion itself, courts unanimously 
agree that the discretion is limited, but disagree on the contours of the limits. 
The Ninth Circuit cited to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for the 
proposition that the limits of executive conditions on federal spending 
become stricter as the Executive’s goals diverge from the intent of Congress.22 
The Second Circuit relied on the Administrative Procedures Act for the 
proposition that the Executive’s discretion is broad, limited only by arbitrary 
and capricious actions which would include grant conditions that are 
coercive.23 Several district courts relied on the provisions articulated in South 
Dakota v. Dole that describe the limits on congressional conditional spending, 
namely that the conditions must provide unambiguous guidance to grant 
recipients, be related to the underlying purpose of the grant program, and 
avoid financial inducements that “might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”24 While these courts seem to agree 
that the Dole provisions should apply to executive conditions on spending, 
they have struggled to consistently apply the provisions.25 For example,  
 
 20. City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Philadelphia v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Concluding that Congress did not grant the 
Attorney General this authority [to add conditions], we hold that the Challenged Conditions 
were unlawfully imposed.”); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(noting that “Congress may, of course, delegate such authority to the Executive Branch” but that 
delegation did not occur), reh’g granted in part and vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 
(June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (Aug. 10, 2018); City of 
Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 
934 (9th Cir. 2019); see also City of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 
2018) (stating, in relation to the President’s power utilized in E.O. 13,768, “In this instance, 
because Congress has the exclusive power to spend and has not delegated authority to the 
Executive to condition new grants on compliance with § 1373, the President’s ‘power is at its 
lowest ebb.’ And when it comes to spending, the President has none of ‘his own constitutional 
powers’ to ‘rely’ upon.” (citations omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952))). 
 21. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (determining “that the 
plain language of the relevant statutes authorizes the Attorney General to impose the challenged 
conditions”). 
 22. City of San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1233 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 
637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 23. New York, 951 F.3d at 123 (“Thus, it was hardly arbitrary or capricious for DOJ to impose 
these conditions without discussing detrimental effects that they were unlikely to cause.”); id. at 
116 (“This case is much more akin to Dole [not coercive] than to NFIB [coercive].”). 
 24. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 25. See infra Section III.C.1. 
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courts disagree whether the delegation of authority to the Executive should 
be unambiguous, or whether executive conditions themselves should be 
unambiguous, or both.26 Furthermore, whereas Congress appropriates grants-
in-aid via legislation, the Executive administers the grant programs in several 
stages, including solicitation announcements, application intake, and awards, 
raising a question of when the inquiry into ambiguity should happen.27 
The diversity of opinions in the lower courts coupled with a split among 
the circuit courts has opened the door for the Supreme Court to weigh in on 
this issue. As the Second Circuit opined, these cases 
implicate[] several of the most divisive issues confronting our 
country and, consequently, filling daily news headlines: national 
immigration policy, the enforcement of immigration laws, the status 
of illegal aliens in this country, and the ability of States and localities 
to adopt policies on such matters contrary to, or at odds with, those 
of the federal government.28 
Adding to these stakes are recent changes at the Supreme Court. No 
conditional spending grant has been invalidated by the Supreme Court since 
1936, although scholars have predicted the Spending Clause’s demise since 
the “federalism revolution” of the Rehnquist Court.29 These predictions have 
yet to materialize but the modern controversy over sanctuary cities is a  
recipe for their resurrection. In particular, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh 
have articulated concerns about expanding federal power, and federal 
administrative power in particular.30 The question of sua sponte executive 
conditions on federal grants-in-aid poses a ripe opportunity for skeptics of 
federal power to rein in the Executive, but also the Spending Clause more 
generally. 
In this Article, I argue that executive conditions on federal spending are 
entirely appropriate, but only when Congress has unambiguously delegated 
authority to add conditions. This predicate of delegatory clarity lies in some 
tension with Chevron deference, though to be clear there need not be clarity 
from Congress on the conditions to be imposed, merely on the fact that 
authority to add conditions has been delegated. My primary argument is thus 
quite modest: Congressional delegation should not be a loophole in the Dole 
doctrine. In other words, when Congress (unambiguously) delegates to the 
Executive authority to add conditions on federal grants, the Executive should 
 
 26. See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.  
 27. See Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 
1233–36 (2001) (discussing temporal challenges in Spending Clause cases); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending 
Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1216–22 (2004) (discussing 
the impact of the timing of executive conditions on the notice provided to state grant recipients). 
 28. New York, 951 F.3d at 90.  
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
 30. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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also be subject to the Dole framework. My argument admittedly goes a bit 
further, however. Because the power of the purse remains with Congress, I 
propose that executive conditions on spending should be held to a higher 
standard of review than congressional conditions.  
Why should courts be more skeptical of executive conditions than of 
those enacted by Congress? Indeed, because the Executive is already subject 
to congressional rebuke, judicial intervention may appear unnecessary. 
However, the central constitutional concern in Spending Clause cases is not 
the separation of powers, but the undue aggrandizement of federal power at 
the (literal) expense of the states. And inter-branch coordination enflames 
rather than alleviates this problem. Furthermore, the upshot of our proposed 
rigid-Dole test is that conditions on federal spending will likely shift away  
from the Executive to Congress, which may be desirable on accountability 
grounds.31 
In Part II, I briefly summarize the history of the Spending Clause from 
the 1770s through the mid-2000s, highlighting the long record of Executive 
involvement in the administration of grant-in-aid programs.32 I also trace the 
slow rollback of federal power by the Supreme Court beginning in 1995.33 I 
show that between 1995 and 2012 the Supreme Court imposed limits on 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause,34 the Tenth Amendment,35 
and the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments.36 I also 
show how the Court expanded the zone of state sovereignty by expanding  
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity doctrine.37 The 
Spending Clause has so far escaped unscathed.38 
In Part III, I outline the Trump administration’s attempts to invigorate 
immigration enforcement by targeting sanctuary cities and counties. I 
summarize the fate of E.O. 13,768 and the Attorney General’s conditions on 
Byrne JAG funds in the courts. In February 2020, the Second Circuit reversed 
a lower court ruling that had invalidated the Attorney General’s conditions, 
creating a circuit split on the constitutionality of executive conditional 
spending.39 
 
 31. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal 
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is 
diminished.”). 
 32. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 33. See infra Section II.C. 
 34. See infra Section II.C. 
 35. See infra Section II.C. 
 36. See infra Section II.C. 
 37. See infra Section II.C. 
 38. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 350 
(2008) (“[T]he Court is not likely to [limit conditional spending] in the way some hoped and 
some feared the Rehnquist Court would—by imposing direct limitations on the kinds of 
legislation Congress has power to pass under the Spending Clause.”). 
 39. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2020). 
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In Part IV, I defend the basic logic of South Dakota v. Dole. Several scholars 
have argued that the provisions of Dole are vacuous and illogical, and thus a 
proposal to double-down on Dole in the case of executive conditions is likely 
to draw some critics.40 While I agree that the Dole provisions are analytically 
problematic, I argue that they are a useful heuristic for balancing federal and 
state power. I posit that the core Dole provisions are reasonable proxies for the 
central doctrines of federalism: due process (unambiguousness), enumerated 
federal powers (nexus), and anti-commandeering (coercion). Finally, I note 
that the Dole conditions are the culmination of at least 50 years of organic 
doctrinal evolution, solidified in 1987, cited hundreds of times since, and thus 
entitled to a measure of deference. 
In Part IV, I also highlight three distinct characteristics of the sanctuary 
cities cases that complicate a standard application of Dole. First, the Byrne JAG 
funds have been awarded since 2005 and cities have long incorporated these 
funds into their budgets and relied on their renewal. Adding conditions mid-
stream raises the question of whether notice is even possible pre-award. 
Second, the vast majority of sanctuary jurisdictions are cities and counties. 
These sub-state units do not possess the same elevated sovereignty status 
afforded to states. On the one hand, courts might be more concerned about 
the coercive potential of federal grants in the absence of state-level political 
safeguards of federalism. On the other hand, sub-state jurisdictions are 
subject to higher governmental authorities and they lack the bargaining 
posture of states whose status is explicitly fortified by the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments. Third, the defining characteristic of a sanctuary jurisdiction is 
its antagonistic attitude toward immigration law. In the words of the recent 
Second Circuit opinion on sanctuary cities, “[a]s the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly observed, in the realm of immigration policy, it is the federal 
government that maintains ‘broad[]’ and ‘preeminent[]’ power.”41 
These three distinct characteristics cut in opposite directions and raise 
the possibility that the sanctuary cities cases may be decided on grounds  
other than the Spending Clause. Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s 
response to the recent proliferation of sanctuary jurisdictions raises important 
constitutional questions that have yet to be resolved. Because President 
Trump continues to threaten the withholding of a variety of federal funds 
from uncooperative states and cities—from immigration and law enforcement 
to voting procedures and public health policies—these questions are likely to 
be tested. In Part V, I propose that executive conditions should be subject to 
a rigid-Dole test that balances the discretionary authority of the Executive with 
the Article I authority of Congress to marshal the power of the purse in 
defense of the general welfare of the United States. 
 
 40. See infra Section IV.A. 
 41. New York, 951 F.3d at 90 (citation omitted) (first quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387, 394 (2012); and then quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982)). 
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II. CONDITIONAL SPENDING AND THE EXECUTIVE 
A. HISTORY OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
An estimated $790 billion in federal grant money will be disbursed to 
state and local governments in FY2020.42 These funds are used to fund or 
otherwise subsidize public education, health insurance for the poor,  
job training, housing, transportation, and more. Federal grants currently 
comprise approximately “23 percent of state and local budgets,”43 though the 
federal government was not always so flush with resources. Under the Articles 
of Confederation, the power to tax resided in the states.44 The national 
government primarily raised funds via tariffs, by borrowing from states, and 
by selling land. In some cases, the national government used land grants  
to incentivize states to pursue national policy objectives that the federal 
government could not achieve on its own.45 Even still, the federal government 
was quite weak and dependent on the voluntary compliance of states. One  
of the primary motivations for the 1787 Constitutional Convention was to 
improve the federal government’s ability to raise money to pay back debts 
incurred during the Revolutionary War and to better incentivize states to work 
collectively for the good of the entire Union.46 Thus, the very first enumerated 
 
 42. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED  
STATES GOVERNMENT, HISTORICAL TABLES 251 tbl.12.1 (2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/hist_fy21.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDP8-HN35]. 
 43. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, FEDERAL AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
1 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-federalaid.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZ7C-L9QJ]. 
 44. The only provision of the Articles that explicitly refers to the taxing power gives states 
the authority and responsibility to levy taxes in order to pay down war debts. ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII, para. 2 (“The taxes for paying that proportion [of war debts] 
shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States 
within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.”); see also id. art. II 
(“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled.”). 
 45. ROBERT JAY DILGER & MICHAEL H. CECIRE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40638, FEDERAL 
GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES 12 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40638.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX2Z-3G54] 
(“However, even before the Constitution’s ratification, the federal government found ways to 
provide state and local governments with assistance to encourage them to pursue national policy 
objectives.”). 
 46. Id. at 13 (“When the Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to rework the Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union, the national economy was in recession, state governments 
were saddled with large debts left over from the Revolutionary War, the continental dollar was 
unstable and destined to be a national joke (‘not worth a continental’), the navy could not protect 
international shipping, and the army proved unable to protect its own arsenal during Shay’s 
rebellion in 1786.”); see also ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE 
REVOLUTION 1775–1789, at 556 (1924) (“As for the unneighborly regulations of the States, 
Hamilton feared in the light of the past that they would become more and more ‘serious sources 
of animosity and discord.’ Of this group of disputes, those hinging upon State tariffs were 
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authority of the new federal government read: “The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts 
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United 
States.”47 
Even with this new authority to collect taxes, Congress continued to offer 
states ownership of land in the early years of the Republic in exchange for 
state investments in public education and infrastructure projects, like canals 
and harbors.48 
Formal federal grant-in-aid programs primarily developed in the wake of 
the Civil War when the federal government asserted its authority vis-à-vis the 
states.49 Because these new programs drew funds from the U.S. Treasury, 
Congress began to attach conditions on the grants to disincentivize frivolous 
or fraudulent spending by the states. For example, Congress frequently 
required states to provide matching funds as a way to create shared incentives 
for efficient use of the federal grant money. Congress also attached strings to 
these grants to ensure that the states complied with the purpose of the grant. 
For example, the Morrill Act of 1890 authorized the Secretary of Treasury to 
withhold education funding from states that failed to eliminate race as an 
admissions criterion to colleges and universities.50 
The ratification of the federal income tax in 1913 changed the game.51 
With a near-instant infusion of cash into the Federal Treasury, Congress was 
able to dangle serious sums of money in exchange for policy concessions by 
the states. States immediately challenged this expansion of federal power. In 
1923, the state of Massachusetts sued the Secretary of Treasury for violating 
state sovereignty by requiring the state to account for its expenditure of 
 
paramount in importance. . . . ‘The king of New York levied imposts upon New Jersey and 
Connecticut,’ later wrote Fisher Ames, ‘and the nobles of Virginia bore with impatience their 
tributary dependence upon Baltimore and Philadelphia. Our discontents were fermenting into 
civil war.’”). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 48. DILGER & CECIRE, supra note 45, at 12–13 (“These land grants for public education were 
reauthorized by Congress in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Congress subsequently adopted 
similar legislation for all states admitted to the union from 1802 to 1910 . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 49. Id. at 15–16. 
 50. Agricultural College Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. § 326 (2018) (commonly referred to as the 
Morrill Act of 1890 or “Second Morrill Act” after Vermont Representative and sponsor Justin 
Smith Morrill) (“On or before the 1st day of October in each year, the Secretary of Agriculture 
shall ascertain and certify to the Secretary of the Treasury as to each State and Territory whether 
it is entitled to receive its share of the annual appropriation for colleges, or of institutions for 
colored students, under this subchapter, and the amount which thereupon each is entitled, 
respectively, to receive.”). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
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federal funds earmarked for maternal health and prenatal care.52 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of standing, but importantly noted 
that because the grants were optional, they could not be deemed coercive to 
states as sovereigns in violation of the Tenth Amendment.53 
During the New Deal era, the scope of federal grant programs exploded. 
The Social Security Act of 1935 was perhaps the most important, providing 
funds for elder care, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent 
children, conditional on successful financial audits by the Executive branch.54 
The central provisions of the Social Security Act were upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1937 as a proper exercise of the Taxing and Spending Clause.55 The 
Court relied on its 1936 holding in United States v. Butler that congressional 
spending was appropriate so long as it broadly advances the general welfare.56 
The Court in Butler rejected the argument that the Taxing and Spending 
Clause was confined solely to federal expenditures in pursuit of the 
enumerated powers of Congress.57  
Congress took advantage of this broad power during the 1950s when it 
provided more than $2 billion in funding to states to support the construction 
of the federal highway system.58 In 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken that when Congress adds conditions to 
its grant-in-aid programs, the conditions must be relevant to the objectives  
 
 52. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923) (challenging the constitutionality 
of the Sheppard–Towner Act of 1921, commonly referred to as the “Maternity Act.”). 
 53. Id. at 480 (“Probably, it would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are 
not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State 
is free to accept or reject.”); see Cynthia Cates Colella, The United States Supreme Court and 
Intergovernmental Relations, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TODAY: PERSPECTIVES 
AND CONTROVERSIES 30, 47 (Robert Jay Dilger ed., 1986). 
 54. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. I, 49 Stat. 620 (grants for old age assistance); 
id. tit. III (grants for unemployment); id. tit. IV (grants for aid to dependent children); id. tit. V 
(grants for maternal and child welfare). 
 55. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of  
the payroll tax); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592 (1937) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the unemployment compensation provisions and citing Massachusetts v. Mellon 
to hold that the provisions were not coercive against the states). 
 56. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936). 
 57. Id. (noting that the Taxing and Spending “clause confers a power separate and distinct 
from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress 
consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement 
that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States”). 
 58. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 “expanded the Interstate System by 1,000 miles 
to 41,000 miles and authorized $25 billion to be made available in fiscal years 1957 through 
1969 for its construction to accommodate traffic demand in 1975. The Federal share of costs 
would be 90 percent,” with approximately $2.5 billion available in grants to states. Richard F. 
Weingroff, Highway History: The Greatest Decade 1956–1966, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50interstate.cfm [https://perma.cc/9LGN-
92ZT] (last updated June 27, 2017). 
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of the underlying funds.59 In the case of federal highway funds, courts 
considered conditions requiring motorcycle helmet laws (1966),60 uniform 
speed limits (1974),61 and a minimum drinking age of 21 (1984)62 to be 
relevant to the overall objectives of a safe interstate highway system. In recent 
years, members of Congress have proposed withholding federal highway 
funding unless states ban texting and driving.63 To date these proposals have 
not garnered majority supports.  
The most consequential federal grant-in-aid program in U.S. history is 
Medicaid. Established in 1965 as part of President Johnson’s “Great Society” 
agenda, Medicaid remains the largest federal grant, comprising approximately 
15 percent of every state’s budget.64 And setting Medicaid aside, the number 
of federal grants to state and local governments nearly tripled between 1960 
and 1968.65 These new programs increasingly employed cross-cutting 
conditions, which are broad statements that apply to all federal funding. For 
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act conditions funding for “any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” on the elimination of racially 
exclusive eligibility requirements.66 In fact, by 1980 the Office of Management 
 
 59. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“[T]he Federal 
Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the 
project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”). 
 60. See Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. § 402(c)(2) (giving the Secretary of 
Transportation discretion to withhold up to 25 percent of federal highway funding for 
noncompliance with Secretary’s uniform safety standards). In 1967 the Secretary issued safety 
standards that required states to adopt universal motorcycle helmet laws. R.G. ULMER & D.F. 
PREUSSER, EVALUATION OF THE REPEAL OF MOTORCYCLE HELMET LAWS IN KENTUCKY AND 
LOUISIANA sec. II (2003). 
 61. See Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 
1046, 1046–47 (1974) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold all federal 
highway funding for noncompliance). 
 62. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. §§ 158–159 (setting  
the national drinking age to 21 and reducing federal highway funding by ten percent for 
noncompliance). The Act was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203 (1987). 
 63. See Matt Richtel, Senators Seek a Ban on Texting and Driving, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/technology/30distracted.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M8YF-H7GK] (explaining congressional threat to revoke 25 percent of federal highway funding 
to states that fail to formally ban texting and driving); see also Brian Resnick & Emma Roller, 
NAT’L J., Four Times the Government Held Highway Funding Hostage, ATLANTIC (July 16, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/four-times-the-government-held-highway-
funding-hostage/454167 [https://perma.cc/BGX6-NYNQ] (discussing the four times the 
federal government has withheld federal funding to force state action, including drinking age, 
speed limit, and motorcycle helmet laws). 
 64. Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, https:// 
www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets [https://perma.cc/DJW5-7TPQ] 
(reporting that Medicaid “account[s] for 15.9 percent of spending from state general funds” as 
of Fiscal Year 2015).  
 65. DILGER & CECIRE, supra note 45, at 21 (reporting that the number of federal grants to 
state and local governments increased “from 132 in 1960 to 387 in 1968”). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018). 
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and Budget (“OMB”) counted 59 cross-cutting requirements in various 
federal statutes.67 
In addition to the increasing number of federal grants and scope of 
conditions on those grants, the motivation for conditional spending has 
changed in recent years. In particular, federal grants have increasingly been 
used to push states and local governments into new policy areas.68 This shift 
has been referred to as “coercive federalism,” where grants that used to 
incentivize efficient intergovernmental cooperation are now used “to ensure 
the supremacy of federal policy.”69 Not coincidentally, the number of 
unfunded mandates increased from zero between “1941–63, [to] nine 
[between] 1964–69, [and] twenty-five [in] the 1970’s.”70 
The Supreme Court showed signs of pushing back against this expansion 
of power in the 1980s. In the 1984 case Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, the Court held that Congress must articulate any conditions on 
federal funds unambiguously, otherwise states are entitled to the funds.71 In  
the 1987 case South Dakota v. Dole the Supreme Court summarized the 
constitutional limit on the Spending Clause of Article I, holding that states 
are entitled to federal grants unless the conditions on those grants are stated 
unambiguously (citing to Pennhurst), related to the purpose of the spending 
program (citing to Ivanhoe v. McCracken), and not coercive (citing to 
Massachusetts v. Mellon).72 Subsequent courts have cited to Dole more than 400 
times and it has become the canonical test for states challenging conditions 
of federal outlays.73 In almost every case, although Congress appropriates  
the funds at issue, states file suit against the Executive because, in practice, 
administrative agencies ultimately implement most grant programs. 
 
 67. DILGER & CECIRE, supra note 45, at 27. 
 68. See John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 139, 150–52 (1990) (describing the use of federal grants to spur recalcitrant states on 
economic inequality and affirmative action). 
 69. Id. 
 70. John Kincaid, Coercive Federalism, CTR. FOR STUDY FEDERALISM, http://encyclopedia. 
federalism.org/index.php/Coercive_Federalism [https://perma.cc/KQ2Z-Z3AH] (last updated 
Mar. 2018).  
 71. Pennhust State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation 
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract . . . . The legitimacy 
of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ There can, of course, be no 
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is 
expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal 
moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” (citations omitted)). 
 72. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–10 (1987). 
 73. According to Westlaw KeyCite search there are 447 citations to Dole since 1987. Citing 
References, South Dakota v. Dole, WESTLAW, https://westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2020). 
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B. MARIONETTIST EXECUTIVE 
The Executive plays a crucial role in the appropriation of federal funds. 
In most cases, Congress delegates authority to the Executive to administer and 
implement federal spending programs and grants-in-aid.74 This authority 
extends to grant solicitation and monitoring and tracking applications, 
awards, and post-award audits.75 In fact, the primary responsibility of the 
Executive vis-à-vis spending for much of modern American history has been 
to monitor spending to ensure compliance with congressional directives and 
to guard against fraud and abuse.76 
In some policy domains Congress has delegated increasing authority to 
the Executive including, in some cases, the authority to develop conditions 
itself. For example, in the context of deploying international aid dollars, 
Congress has delegated broad authority to set conditions, identify priorities, 
and administer the aid programs however the Executive decides best meets 
the country’s foreign policy priorities.77 In other areas of the law, Congress 
has delegated very specific authority to the Executive that severely limits  
its discretion. For example, in the context of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Congress delegated authority to the Department of 
Education to monitor compliance with new federal guidelines, but limited  
the Department’s ability to enforce this compliance. Specifically, Congress 
provided for “pinpoint” enforcement that stipulates that if the Department 
seeks to terminate grant funding, “such termination or refusal shall be limited 
to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom 
such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the 
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been 
so found.”78 
In some cases the Executive has unilaterally rescinded funding against 
the wishes of Congress. Notably, after Congress overrode President Nixon’s 
veto of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Act, Nixon 
refused to disburse all of the appropriated funds.79 Congress responded by 
passing the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act which 
prohibited the President from impounding funds without first getting 
 
 74. DILGER & CECIRE, supra note 45, at 1. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See id. at 18 (“[F]ederal administrative conditions attached to these grants [between 
1930s and 1960s] focused on the prevention of corruption and fraudulent expenditures . . . .”). 
 77. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151t(a) (2018) (“[T]he President is authorized to furnish 
assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to countries and areas through 
programs of grant and loan assistance, bilaterally or through regional, multilateral, or private 
entities.”). 
 78. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
 79. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). 
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approval from Congress.80 Presidential impoundments are the most extreme 
form of executive conditional spending: withholding federal funding against 
the wishes of Congress, often without notice, and for nakedly political 
reasons.81 
More recently, President Trump has threatened in broad terms to 
withhold federal funding from Michigan and Nevada if they adopted vote-by-
mail procedures for the November 2020 election,82 to withhold funding from 
states that do not mandate in-person learning in K-12 public schools,83 and to 
defund police departments that fail to “protect monuments, memorials, and 
statues from destruction and vandalism.”84 
 
 80. 2 U.S.C. § 683(a) (“Whenever the President determines that all or part of any budget 
authority will not be required to carry out the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is 
provided or that such budget authority should be rescinded for fiscal policy or other reasons 
(including the termination of authorized projects or activities for which budget authority has 
been provided), or whenever all or part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year is 
to be reserved from obligation for such fiscal year, the President shall transmit to both Houses of 
Congress a special message . . . .”). 
 81. See generally Abner J. Mikva & Michael F. Hertz, Impoundment of Funds—The Courts, The 
Congress and The President: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 NW. U. L. REV. 335 (1974) (providing the 
history of impoundment and examining the related precedent, constitutional provisions, and 
congressional action). Note that budget rescissions or deferrals under the Impoundment Control 
Act are not limited to federal grants to the states. For example, in July 2019 the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”) initiated a delay of appropriated funds to aid Ukraine’s 
defense against Russian encroachment. The delay was alleged to have been motivated by political 
concerns since it was initiated a few hours after President Trump pressed the President of Ukraine 
to investigate former Vice President Biden. The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) later determined that the proposed delay in funding violated the Impoundment 
Control Act. The funding delay was cited as evidence that President Trump had abused his office 
in the first article of impeachment that was passed by the House of Representatives. Emily 
Cochrane, Eric Lipton & Chris Cameron, G.A.O. Report Says Trump Administration Broke Law in 
Withholding Ukraine Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/ 
us/politics/gao-trump-ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/WK68-DMKP]. 
 82. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 20, 2020, 8:11 AM), https:// 
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1263094958417985538. 
 83. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 8, 2020, 8:16 AM), https:// 
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1280853299600789505. Secretary of Education Betsy 
DeVos also repeated this threat in a Fox News interview with Chris Wallace on July 12, 2020. 
 84. Exec. Order No. 13933, Executive Order on Protecting American Monuments, 
Memorials, and Statues and Combating Recent Criminal Violence, 85 Fed. Reg. 40,081 (June 26, 
2020). Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt told Fox News that “[w]e are going to examine 
all of our funding mechanisms to these communities and to the extent that we have the authority, 
we will take into account their failure to protect these monuments.” Veronica Stracqualursi, 
Interior Secretary Threatens to Withhold Funds from State and Local Governments Unless They Protect 
Monuments, CNN (June 27, 2020, 1:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/27/politics/ 
monuments-funding-interior-secretary-david-bernhardt/index.html [https://perma.cc/5ZB5-
ZM86]. This particular threat garnered attention in Congress. On July 2, the House Minority 
Leader Kevin McCarthy said he would introduce a bill to block federal funding for states that fail 
to protect monuments and statues. Caitlin McFall, McCarthy Says He’ll Introduce Bill Blocking Funds 
for States that Don’t Protect Statues, FOX NEWS (July 2, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
mccarthy-says-hell-introduce-bill-blocking-funds-for-states-that-dont-protect-statues [https:// 
perma.cc/Z99R-A23A]. 
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How should courts interpret these threats? How should they construe  
the various delegation arrangements with Congress when the Executive 
announces conditions on spending? Does authority to add conditions on 
spending inherently attach to delegations to implement federal grant 
programs generally, or must that authority be delegated separately and 
unambiguously? In the context of sanctuary jurisdictions, a recent Second 
Circuit opinion held that Congress had functionally delegated authority to 
add conditions even though the authority had not been directly delegated.85 
As I discuss below, this decision coexists uncomfortably with the requirement 
in Dole that conditions be announced unambiguously: Why should conditions 
be unambiguous while the source of the conditions remains uncertain? In 
other words, how should courts resolve the tension between the required 
clarity in Dole with the tolerance for ambiguity in Chevron? I take up this 
question in Part III. 
C. FEDERALISM REVOLUTION 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Spending Clause is its 
unyoked relationship to the enumerated powers of Congress. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly rejected the argument that the Spending Clause only 
authorizes federal spending in pursuit of Article I powers; a kind of monetary 
Necessary and Proper Clause.86 Instead, the Court has found that the power 
of the purse is “limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to 
provide for the general welfare of the United States.”87 The upshot is that 
Congress can, and has, used the Spending Clause to circumvent the 
(otherwise) express limits on its power.88 As a result, one might expect the 
Spending Clause to be the first place federalists would look to rein in the 
aggrandizement of congressional power. Instead, beginning in 1995, the 
Supreme Court significantly scaled back the power and reach of the federal 
government on multiple fronts while largely ignoring the Spending Clause. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School 
Zones Act on the grounds that Congress lacked the authority to regulate the 
possession of handguns under the Commerce Clause.89 The Court’s holding 
in Lopez marked the first time in 58 years that an Act of Congress was 
invalidated under the Commerce Clause and it ushered in a “federalism 
revolution” that saw the powers of Congress curtailed across a number of 
 
 85. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 90–91, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 86. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 87. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).  
 88. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 
(1999) (“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the 
States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take . . . .”). 
 89. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).  
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domains in exchange for expanded state power.90 With respect to the 
Commerce Clause, the Rehnquist Court invalidated portions of the Violence 
Against Women Act in 200091 and the intrastate enforcement of the 
Controlled Substances Act in 2005.92 However, the Court had more arrows in 
its quiver. 
In 1997, the Rehnquist Court invalidated an enforcement provision of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers 
on an interim basis until the Attorney General established a national 
background check system.93 The Court rejected this arrangement because 
“the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the 
power to regulate individuals, not States.”94 Citing to the Tenth Amendment 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, the majority held that the federal 
government may not commandeer state officials to enforce federal regulatory 
programs.95 Federal power was thus cabined even further. 
The Supreme Court put its thumb on the scale against the federal 
government in other ways, too. For example, the Court narrowed the 
authority of Congress to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments in City of 
Boerne v. Flores (1997),96 and interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to 
exclude anti-subordination efforts in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995).97 
During this same period, the Supreme Court explicitly expanded the 
rights of states. For example, in 1999 the Court held that states cannot be 
sued by private individuals in their own state courts.98 This holding was 
especially consequential since the Eleventh Amendment protects states from 
 
 90. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) 
(explaining the “federalism revolution” that took place under the Rehnquist Court). See generally 
Engstrom, supra note 27 (discussing the impact of the timing of executive conditions on the 
notice provided to state grant recipients). 
 91. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 92. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). 
 93. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–34 (1997) (invalidating Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103–159, sec. 102, § 102(a)(2), 107 Stat. 1536 (1993)). 
 94. Id. at 920 (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 923, 935 (“What destroys the dissent’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument, 
however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper Clause itself.”); id. at 923 
n.13 (“This argument also falsely presumes that the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual 
source of protection for principles of federalism.”); see also id. at 935–36 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 96. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress may 
not determine how states enforce legislative restrictions). 
 97. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that 
racial classifications must pass strict scrutiny review). 
 98. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749–54 (1999) (“A power to press a State’s own courts 
into federal service . . . is the power . . . to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State 
against its will . . . .”). 
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being sued by private individuals in federal courts.99 The result was that 
plaintiffs seeking redress for unlawful state action were left with no legal 
forum to hold states accountable.100 The Court recently affirmed this outcome 
by clarifying that states cannot be sued in other states’ courts either.101 
Notably absent from the Court’s jurisprudence during this “federalism 
revolution” were cases reining in the power of Congress under the Spending 
Clause. Indeed, several scholars noted that the Court’s federalism cases were 
like squeezing a balloon: While limiting so many other channels of federal 
power, the Court had unwittingly expanded the power of Congress under the 
Spending Clause. Chemerinsky wrote in 2001 that “we may be seeing 
Congress trying to achieve through the [Spending Clause] what it’s not going 
to be able to achieve through the commerce power or through Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”102 Baker and Berman predicted in 2003 that 
an ambitious Congress may expand its ballooning power under the Spending 
Clause to the point where it pops.103 In 2008, Bagenstos predicted a more 
limited retrenchment. Because Spending Clause cases are often cast as 
contracts between Congress and the states, Bagenstos argued that courts were 
likely to employ theories of contract law that would curtail the scope of 
conditional spending.104 These predictions of the Spending Clause’s demise 
proved somewhat exaggerated. 
In only a single case since 1936 has the Supreme Court invalidated a 
conditional spending program under the Spending Clause. In 2012, the 
Roberts Court held that Congress could not condition all of the federal 
government’s Medicaid funding to states on compliance with a new federal 
Medicaid mandate. According to the majority, the denial of all funds is “more 
than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”105 The Court 
stopped short, however, of invalidating the Medicaid mandate. Instead, the 
Court upheld the underlying conditions on federal spending by interpreting 
their reach to only the marginal costs of those conditions.106 
 
 99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”). 
 100. See generally Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment forecloses an 
individual’s ability to sue a state in that state’s courts). 
 101. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019). 
 102. Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 18. Some scholars have argued that Congress should 
expand its spending authority in this era to achieve important policy goals, like environmental 
protection. See, e.g., Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: 
A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 161–62 (2001). 
 103. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 
459, 460–61 (2003). 
 104. Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 385–410. 
 105. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).  
 106. The Court was split on the Medicaid provisions of the Affordable Care Act. Five Justices 
voted to invalidate the conditions on Medicaid as applied to all Medicaid funds, and four Justices 
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Since 2012 the Court has been relatively silent with respect to the 
Spending Clause. The recent controversy over sanctuary cities is likely to 
resurrect predictions of the Clause’s inconspicuous destiny.107 In particular, 
the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Court raise the 
prospect that the federalism revolution is far from over. Both Justices Gorsuch 
and Kavanaugh have articulated concerns about expanding federal power, 
and federal administrative power in particular.108 Thus, the question of sua 
sponte executive conditions on federal grants-in-aid poses a ripe opportunity 
 
would have upheld the conditions on all Medicaid funding. Chief Justice Roberts split from  
the majority and held that the conditions on Medicaid funding could apply to new funds (to 
accommodate the proposed expansion) and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor concurred on this 
point to save the conditions. Id. at 646 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“The Chief Justice is undoubtedly right to conclude 
that Congress may offer States funds ‘to expand the availability of health care, and requir[e] that 
States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use.’” (alteration in original)). 
There were thus seven votes to invalidate the conditions as enacted, but no majority on the 
remedy: four Justices would have invalidated the conditions and three would apply the conditions 
just to new funding. Under Supreme Court precedent, “When a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). Thus, the narrower conclusion of Justices Roberts, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor controls. 
 107. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 
81 (2014) (arguing that the Court’s analysis in NFIB v. Sebelius has already neutered the Spending 
Clause and that “[t]he Court’s 1987 five-pronged Dole test seems no longer to be the governing 
doctrine, but it is far from clear what has replaced it”). 
 108. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal 
laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that design. It purports to endow the 
nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a 
half-million citizens. Yes, those affected are some of the least popular among us. But if a single 
executive branch official can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does 
that mean for the next?”). As a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch strongly signaled a 
desire to limit the dominion of the administrative state. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 
1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“There’s an elephant in the room with 
us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked. 
But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of 
core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than 
a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come 
to face the behemoth.”). Justice Kavanaugh has expressed concerns about the Chevron doctrine 
in academic articles as well as judicial opinions. See also VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10204, DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME  
COURT OVERRULE CHEVRON? 3 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2KF6-HNHZ] (“In his scholarly writing, Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Chevron 
doctrine incentivizes federal agencies to push the boundaries of their statutory authority, taking 
actions unless ‘clearly forbidden.’ . . . Justice Kavanaugh’s judicial opinions from his time on the 
D.C. Circuit reflect these concerns.”); Jacob Gershman, Brett Kavanaugh Has Shown Deep Skepticism 
of Regulatory State, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2018, 11:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nominee-
has-shown-deep-skepticism-of-regulatory-state-1531186402 [https://perma.cc/LED6-U3SY]. 
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for the Court to not only rein in the Spending Clause, but also the regulatory 
state more specifically. 
III. SANCTUARY CITIES AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,768 
One week after the new administration took power in January 2017, 
President Trump issued Executive Order 13,768,109 and in so doing, set 
federal courts on the course to confront the issue of executive conditional 
spending. The Executive Order, entitled “Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States,” issued a policy which directed the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that state and local 
jurisdictions who refuse to comply with federal efforts at immigration 
enforcement would not receive federal grants.110 The E.O. states (in relevant 
part): 
Section 1. Purpose. Interior enforcement of our Nation’s 
immigration laws is critically important to the national security and 
public safety of the United States. Many aliens who illegally enter the 
United States and those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms 
of their visas present a significant threat to national security and 
public safety. This is particularly so for aliens who engage in criminal 
conduct in the United States. 
Sanctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate 
Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the 
United States. These jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm 
to the American people and to the very fabric of our Republic. . . . 
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the executive branch to: 
(a) Ensure the faithful execution of the immigration laws of the 
United States, including the INA, against all removable aliens, 
consistent with Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution 
and section 3331 of title 5, United States Code; 
(b) Make use of all available systems and resources to ensure the 
efficient and faithful execution of the immigration laws of the 
United States; 
(c) Ensure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable 
Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by  
law . . . .111 
 
 109. Exec. Order No. 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. BYRNE JAG FUNDS 
In response to the Executive Order, in July 2017, the Attorney General 
attached immigration-related conditions to federal grants under the control 
of the Department of Justice—the “Byrne JAG” grants.112 The Byrne JAG 
program is the primary source by which state and local jurisdictions receive 
federal funding to support various criminal justice institutions and 
programs.113 It has been referred to as “the cornerstone federal justice 
assistance program.”114 
The Department of Justice did not attempt to conceal its intentions in 
imposing the Byrne JAG conditions—Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated 
that the conditions were imposed in order to “encourage . . . ‘sanctuary’ 
jurisdictions to change their policies.”115 The conditions imposed three 
requirements on sanctuary jurisdictions: state and local law enforcement were 
to provide “48 hours notice before . . . releas[ing] an illegal alien wanted by 
federal authorities”116; U.S. Department of Homeland Security personnel 
were to be afforded the ability “to access any detention facility” for the 
purpose of “meet[ing] with an alien” in order to “inquire as to his or her right 
to be or remain in the United States;”117 and jurisdictions were to “certify 
compliance with [8 U.S.C. §] 1373, a federal statute” which prohibits states 
from limiting voluntary exchanges of immigration and citizenship information 
to and from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.118 The Attorney 
General added two more similarly-themed conditions to the grants the 
following year.119  
These two actions—Executive Order 13,768 and the Byrne JAG 
conditions—quickly found their way into federal courts when various 
 
 112. Byrne JAG Press Release, supra note 10. The full title of the grant program is the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, which was established through the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. NAT’L CTR. FOR JUST. PLAN., CORNERSTONE FOR 
JUSTICE: BYRNE JAG AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
CORNERSTONE FOR JUSTICE REPORT], https://www.bja.gov/Publications/NCJA_JAGReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NX4G-DJPG]. 
 113. Byrne JAG: Funding State and Local Criminal Justice Programs, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, 
https://www.ncja.org/investing-byrne-jag [https://perma.cc/58BF-C6FT]. The top five areas 
where state and local authorities used Byrne JAG money in 2016 were: “Drug, Gang, and Other 
Task Force Operations/Personnel”; “Law Enforcement Equipment”; “Prosecution and Indigent 
Defense Initiatives”; “Corrections and Community Corrections”; and “Crime Prevention 
Programs.” Looking at the Data: How States Invest Byrne JAG, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, https:// 
www.ncja.org/data-on-how-states-invest-byrne-jag [https://perma.cc/FE5J-LPLC]. 
 114. CORNERSTONE FOR JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 112, at 2. 
 115. Byrne JAG Press Release, supra note 10. 
 116. Id. 
 117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BACKGROUNDER ON GRANT REQUIREMENTS (2017), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/984346/download [https://perma.cc/L552-G9ZK]. 
 118. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018); Byrne JAG Press Release, supra note 10. 
 119. City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 3d 748, 753–55 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff’d and remanded, 
961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2020).  
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sanctuary jurisdictions filed lawsuits challenging their constitutionality. The 
Executive Order was challenged in California district court within a week of 
its publication120 and the Byrne JAG conditions were challenged in numerous 
district courts, including those of Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and New 
York.121 These district courts, along with the circuit courts who would later 
hear the appeals, faced a jurisprudential quandary about how to harness 
conditional spending power, a power that has typically belonged to Congress. 
The main confusion among the courts has been in how to interpret the 
Spending Clause and the Supreme Court precedent in South Dakota v. Dole, 
because Dole and other Spending Clause cases generally only contemplate 
situations where Congress was the entity that attached conditions to federal 
grants.122  
C. IN THE COURTS 
When the decisions in the federal cases that contemplated Executive 
Order 13,768 and the Byrne JAG conditions are taken as a whole, two 
overarching categories of judicial approaches appear. One category is 
comprised of the circuit and district courts which held that the dispositive 
issue was whether Congress actually delegated conditional spending power to 
the Executive in the cases before them. Because these courts determined that 
Congress did not delegate the power, they never reached a discussion of the 
substance of the imposed conditions in relation to the conditional spending 
doctrine of South Dakota v. Dole. This approach was taken by the First, Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, as well as several district courts, including the 
district courts for the Northern District of Illinois and Southern District of 
New York.123  
 
 120. The lawsuit was filed by the City of San Francisco on January 31, 2017, and a motion to 
relate the case to the lawsuit filed by the County of Santa Clara on February 3, 2017 was later 
granted. See generally County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(opining on challenges to an executive order). 
 121. The cases include City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); 
City of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part and vacated in 
part sub nom. City of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, 89 
U.S.L.W. 3172 (U.S. Nov. 19, 2020) (No. 20-666); City of Chicago, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 748; and 
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 951 F.3d 
84 (2d Cir. 2020).  
 122. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 639–52; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–85 (2012); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 
U.S. 291, 295–96 (2006). 
 123. These cases are City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Philadelphia 
v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 
2018), reh’g granted in part and vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (June 4, 2018), 
vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (Aug. 10, 2018); City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 
882; City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019); City of Chicago, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 
748; and New York, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 213. 
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The Ninth Circuit dealt with Executive Order 13,768 and the Byrne JAG 
conditions in separate cases. In the first, the court analyzed the President’s 
power to issue E.O. 13,768 pursuant to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. 
Sawyer.124 In the second, the court held that Congress had not delegated 
conditional spending power to the Department of Justice in a way that would 
justify the Byrne JAG conditions themselves.125 There is an appeal currently 
docketed in the First Circuit involving the Byrne JAG conditions.  
The other category of judicial approaches is comprised of the district 
courts which made forays into applying Dole to executive conditional 
spending, and did so with varying levels of confusion and accuracy.126 
However, when these cases were appealed, circuit courts focused almost 
exclusively on whether Congress had actually delegated the conditional 
spending power to the Executive in the first place.127 Since they concluded 
that Congress did not delegate the authority to add conditions, the circuit 
courts were silent on the applicability of Dole. 
One notable exception is the recent Second Circuit opinion that 
interpreted the statutory delegation of authority to the Attorney General to 
administer the Byrne JAG program as sufficiently broad to include adding 
conditions on program funding.128 The Second Circuit’s decision focused on 
the question of congressional delegation while intertwining aspects of Dole in 
its analysis, both expressly and implicitly.129 
1. Applying Dole to Executive Conditions 
 The jurisprudential problem created by executive conditions boils down 
to whether limits on the Spending Clause should apply to both Congress and 
the Executive in equal measure. As recent lower court opinions make clear, 
the law is not well-defined on this question. The reason for confusion  
is understandable: The existing case law has only contemplated the 
 
 124. City of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1233–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). 
 125. City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 944–45. 
 126. These cases include City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 644, 654; City of San Francisco, 
349 F. Supp. 3d at 961; County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530, 532–33 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017); and City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *8–9 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 19, 2017). 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 128. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 129. I accept as given that Congress has the ability to delegate its spending power to the 
Executive. As the Seventh Circuit declared, “Congress may, of course, delegate such authority to 
the Executive Branch.” City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g granted 
in part and vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 
& 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (Aug. 10, 2018); see City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 
F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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constitutionality of conditional spending when Congress attaches them.130 As 
courts grapple with executive conditions, they disagree about which doctrines 
to apply and are inconsistent about how they apply the doctrines they do 
choose to apply. 
Regarding the first level of confusion, courts have contemplated a wide 
range of constitutional doctrines when confronted with executive conditional 
spending. District courts have applied traditional separation of powers 
doctrines, arbitrary and capricious agency action analysis, anticommandeering 
and Tenth Amendment arguments, and the conditional spending doctrine in 
Dole—sometimes all in the same decision.131 In the context of challenges to 
Executive Order 13,768 directly, courts have replaced their arbitrary and 
capricious analysis with discussions of vagueness and procedural due process 
under the Fifth Amendment.132 Among all of the cases that have addressed 
these executive-issued conditions substantively, no particular doctrinal line of 
argument has dominated the others. 
Lower courts that apply the Dole framework have been inconsistent. 
Judges are split on the relevant inquiry to satisfy the ambiguity prong of  
Dole. Is a court to look to the Byrne JAG authorizing statute,133 official 
proclamations of the Department of Justice,134 or grant award letters? In short, 
courts have conflated the ambiguity of Congress’s delegation of authority  
to add conditions on Byrne JAG funds with the ambiguity of the conditions 
themselves.135 There is also a temporal component that inherently creates 
 
 130. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 539–40 (2012); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 
U.S. 291, 296 (2006). 
 131. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 590–91; City of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 
3d at 934. The wide range of doctrines that district courts have addressed is partly explained by 
noting that the complaints challenging these conditions advanced a variety of bases for their 
unconstitutionality. 
 132. E.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 534–36 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 133. E.g., City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 593 (“However, regardless of the amount of 
authority delegated by Congress to the awarding agency, all grant terms must be consistent with 
the authorizing statute.”). 
 134. E.g., City of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The 
Administration asks us to look beyond the Executive Order’s text and the Administration’s 
rhetoric to give controlling construction to the DOJ Memorandum.”). 
 135. In City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania simultaneously contemplated the actions of both Congress and the Executive in 
trying to ascertain whether the conditions were unambiguous. In concluding that the three Byrne 
JAG conditions did not pass the Dole test, the court stated that two of the conditions “cannot have 
been unambiguously authorized by Congress if they were never statutorily authorized.” City of 
Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 646. But this statement is ambiguous itself—is the court 
concluding that: Congress imposed ambiguous conditions (strange, because the Attorney 
General imposed the conditions), that the Attorney General was not unambiguously authorized by 
Congress to impose the conditions (strange, because Dole requires that the condition itself be 
unambiguous), or that the Attorney General was not delegated the power to impose the 
conditions (a separate argument altogether)? In City of San Francisco v. Sessions, the District Court 
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confusion in applying Dole to executive-issued conditions. Congress 
appropriates grant money, while an agency later administers the grant, 
including making grant solicitation announcements, taking applications from 
state and local jurisdictions, and eventually awarding grants. When should 
courts evaluate the ambiguousness of the proffered conditions? At the 
appropriation/authorizing stage? During the request for proposals and 
solicitation of grants? At the award stage? If courts differ on which stage is 
most probative of constructive notice for grantees, they may arrive at different 
conclusions about different governmental actors. 
This timeline gets even more complicated when the administration 
becomes directly involved via executive order. In analyzing Executive Order 
13,768 courts have made confusing statements about congressional authority 
while analyzing the E.O. for ambiguousness under Dole.136  
As a possible point of clarification, the Supreme Court has stated that 
determining whether a condition is unambiguous can be likened to contract 
formation—i.e., a condition is unambiguous if it can be said that sufficient 
offer and acceptance has occurred.137 But this analogy provides limited clarity 
because there are now two possible sources of the offer: Congress and the 
Executive. Courts have expressly voiced this specific confusion.138 This 
 
for the Northern District of California had similar confusions in analyzing ambiguousness under 
Dole. In its inquiry into the ambiguity of the Byrne JAG conditions, the court first acknowledged 
the Department of Justice’s arguments that the conditions were not ambiguous because they were 
clear in their language, they were listed in the grant awards, and because the grant solicitations 
stated that a grant manager was available to answer questions. City of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 
3d at 956. But the court pivoted from a substantive discussion of the conditions and instead 
concluded that they were ambiguous because there was “no authority within the Byrne JAG 
statute to support the Attorney General’s purported power to impose the new conditions.” Id. at 
957. The court appeared to conflate an analysis of the actual conditions with an inquiry into the 
authority of the Executive to impose the conditions. Some courts have expressly stated their 
confusion in applying existing conditional spending case law to the Byrne JAG conditions. See City 
of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 645 (“Spending Clause ambiguity cases generally involve 
statutory construction, not interpretation of conditions imposed by an agency.”). 
 136. The District Court for the Northern District of California, in County of Santa Clara v. 
Trump, concluded that the unambiguous prong of Dole was not met because the condition  
that Executive Order 13,768 imposed, a withholding of seemingly all federal funds absent 
immigration compliance, “was not an unambiguous condition that the states and local 
jurisdictions voluntarily and knowingly accepted at the time Congress appropriated these funds.” 
County of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 532. Here, although this conclusion was reached in the 
context of the ambiguousness inquiry, the real issue for the court appears to be the fact that it 
was not Congress that imposed the condition. Further, the court combined the act of Congress 
appropriating funds with the act of a state later accepting conditioned funds into a single, 
amorphous action, when these are actually two separate stages of the process. But the court 
offered better reasoning later in the opinion by stating that the E.O.’s condition is also ambiguous 
because it is not clear “what funds are at issue and what conditions apply to those funds.” Id. 
 137. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 138. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46 (posing several questions that the 
contract formation analogy creates, including: “Was it Congress or the agency making the offer?” 
and “What must be unambiguous?,” among others).  
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contract formation analogy has an even more limited effect in the context of 
Executive Order 13,768 because in that case, there is no offer, only an edict 
that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security should act, 
yet the E.O. does not itself attach any conditions. 
With respect to the other Dole factors—relatedness and coercion—the 
lower courts have not struggled nearly as much. For example, in both City of 
San Francisco v. Sessions and City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, the district courts 
determined that the Byrne JAG program’s “focus[] on criminal drug 
enforcement, violent crime, and gang activities” were not sufficiently related 
to “immigration enforcement.”139 Notably, nowhere in the reporting by states 
about their expenditures under Byrne JAG is immigration mentioned. Not a 
single time.140 The courts that have evaluated the nexus of Attorney General 
Session’s immigration-related conditions to the Byrne JAG program have 
found that the connection is insufficient under Dole. Finally, courts have 
largely avoided any discussion of the potential coercion of E.O. 13,768 or the 
Byrne JAG conditions.141 
 
 139. City of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 960; see City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 
639–44. 
 140. See generally, e.g., NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, supra note 13(summarizing how states spend 
their Byrne JAG funds and the term “immigr*” does not appear a single time in the summaries); 
STATE OF HAW. ATT’Y GEN., EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) 
PROGRAM: FY 2018 GRANT APPLICATION PROGRAM NARRATIVE (2018) (discussing Hawaii’s JAG 
program and the term “immigr*” does not appear a single time).  
 141. In City of San Francisco v. Sessions, the conditions were only challenged as violating the 
unambiguous and relatedness requirements of Dole, and the court limited its analysis to those 
prongs. City of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 955. In both County of Santa Clara v. Trump and 
City of Seattle v. Trump, the courts determined that Executive Order 13,768 was coercive without 
much analysis, as it seemingly conditioned all federal grants on immigration compliance. County 
of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 536–38; City of Seattle v. Trump, 2017 WL 4700144, at *9 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017). Two other district courts focused on delegation and did not apply 
the Dole test. See generally City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 3d 748 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (ignoring 
the Dole test when deciding a question of delegation), aff’d and remanded, 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 
2020); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (failing to apply the 
Dole test to a question of delegation), rev’d and remanded, 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020). In City of 
Philadelphia v. Sessions, the court approached the coercive prong of Dole by incorporating it into 
its decision on the City’s separate Tenth Amendment challenge, and the court never actually 
analyzed whether the financial inducement was coercive. City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 
647–51. 
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2. Avoiding Dole Altogether 
The First,142 Second,143 Third,144 Seventh,145 and Ninth Circuits146 have 
primarily focused their inquiry on whether Congress delegated conditional 
spending power to the Executive. Because this decision precedes the 
conditions themselves, these approaches largely avoid the Dole test. Only the 
Second Circuit held that Congress had delegated authority to the Attorney 
General when it required that all grant recipients “comply with . . . all other 
applicable Federal laws.”147 The remaining four circuits held that the Attorney 
General lacked the delegated authority to add conditions on Byrne JAG funds, 
despite this language.148 The Seventh Circuit expressly stated that Congress 
could delegate conditional spending power and the Third Circuit signaled  
the same view.149 The Ninth Circuit offered that Congress could delegate 
conditional spending power to the executive branch in general, but ultimately 
the court narrowed its actual analysis to the President’s use of conditional 
spending power.150 While the Ninth Circuit determined that it was clear that 
Congress had not delegated conditional spending power to the President,151 
it did not hold that lack of delegation as dispositive. The court also analyzed 
the Executive Order pursuant to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 
but ultimately concluded that the order exceeded the President’s authority 
because his power was at its lowest ebb as it was not aligned with the will of 
Congress.152 Unfortunately, all of these circuits—the First, Third, Seventh, 
 
 142. City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 143. New York, 951 F.3d 84, 114–16 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 144. City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 145. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g granted in part and 
vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 
2018 WL 4268814 (Aug. 10, 2018). 
 146. City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2019); City of San Francisco 
v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 147. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(A)(5)(D) (2018); New York, 951 F.3d at 94. 
 148. See City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 35; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 279; City of Chicago, 
888 F.3d at 287; City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 944–45.  
 149. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 283 (“Congress may, of course, delegate such authority to 
the Executive Branch[] . . . .”); see also City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 279 (ruling that Congress 
did not delegate authority to impose conditions). Note both of these opinions framed the issue 
generally as “Executive Branch” authority, without distinguishing between the President and the 
regulatory state more generally. 
 150. City of San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1233–34. 
 151. Id. at 1234. 
 152. Id. at 1233–35 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 637 
–38 (1952)). After its Youngstown analysis, the Ninth Circuit referenced the Executive’s limits on 
impoundment by noting that “[a]bsent congressional authorization, the Administration may not 
redistribute or withhold properly appropriated funds in order to effectuate its own policy goals.” 
Id. at 1235. 
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and Ninth—did not offer any guidance as to what a court should do when 
Congress has delegated conditional spending power to the Executive.153  
There are several aspects of the Second Circuit’s opinion that bear 
highlighting because the opinion not only stands as a counterargument to the 
other circuits, but also poses threshold matters for debate. First, the Second 
Circuit framed the issue not as whether the Attorney General had been 
delegated conditional spending power specifically, but rather whether he had 
been delegated the authority to act in this way more broadly154— i.e., whether 
the conditions represent actions that were permissible through several other 
bases of delegated authority. With this shifted focus, the Second Circuit 
appeared to imply that the Attorney General was not even attaching 
conditions in a way that implicates conditional spending doctrine, but rather 
was operating within his delegated discretion to effectively administer the 
grant program. 
This poses an interesting question because, of course, a certain amount 
of discretion is necessary for the Executive to effectively administer a grant 
program. In this case, however, it does not appear that the conditions were 
necessary to administer the Byrne JAG program; the Attorney General 
explicitly stated that the intent of the conditions was to pursue a particular 
policy agenda.155 To the extent there is any doubt about the purpose of the 
conditions, E.O. 13,768 provides a clear statement of the government’s 
interest, although the Second Circuit does not mention the E.O.156  
A second notable aspect of the Second Circuit’s opinion is its criticism 
that sanctuary jurisdictions are biting the hand that feeds them—that 
sanctuary policies “frustrate” federal immigration enforcement.157 I discuss 
the implications that immigration has on federal–state relations below in 
Section IV.B.  
3. Other Themes 
Beyond the formal inquiries of the Dole test, courts and legal scholars 
have described general concerns that conditional spending implicates. These 
concerns include accountability, notice, and issues related to contract law 
 
 153. The Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that “[w]hether the conscription of local and  
state law enforcement . . . through the sword of withholding federal funds presents other 
Constitutional concerns is not before us.” City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 282. The court then listed 
three cases as a “see generally” citation to this comment, National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, Printz v. United States, and South Dakota v. Dole, perhaps signaling that the court would 
consider anti-commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Dole test as possible bases of 
analysis. Id. at 283. 
 154. New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 101–04 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 155. See Byrne JAG Press Release, supra note 10. 
 156. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (defining the “[p]urpose” of the Executive Order as 
“[i]nterior enforcement of our Nation’s immigration laws”). 
 157. See New York, 951 F.3d at 90. 
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doctrine.158 Executive conditions add even greater complexity and also pose 
the refrain common to any novel issue—whether a slippery slope is being 
constructed.  
Courts have been concerned with issues of notice outside of formal Dole 
inquiries. Whether cities and states have been afforded fair notice in deciding 
whether to apply for or accept grants, and whether they had full awareness of 
what obligations would follow the grants, has been a theme in several cases.159 
Of course, notice can be interwoven into the ambiguousness prong of  
Dole, but here, notice is spoken of outside that inquiry. In the context of 
conditional spending, courts have a choice whether to focus upon the actions 
of the Executive or Congress. Some district courts have contemplated the 
notice afforded by Congress’ language in the Byrne JAG statute underlying 
the executive-issued conditions, noting that the authorizing statute requires 
the Attorney General not to deny a jurisdiction’s application “without first 
affording the applicant reasonable notice of any deficiencies in the application 
and opportunity for correction and reconsideration.”160 
The Second Circuit concluded that sufficient notice to grantee 
jurisdictions was provided by the Executive, reasoning that Congress relies on 
the Executive to resolve ambiguities in administering grant programs.161 On 
the other hand, Executive Order 13,768 has been found to violate procedural 
due process because it seeks to deprive jurisdictions of federal funds before 
affording sufficient notice or opportunity to be heard.162 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF DOLE 
I begin this Part with a pragmatic defense of the basic logic of South 
Dakota v. Dole. Several scholars have argued that the provisions of Dole are 
vacuous and illogical,163 and thus a proposal to double-down on Dole in the 
 
 158. See, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2343–45 (2020); 
David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 535 (2007). 
 159. See Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 
1582–1617 (2015) (summarizing the case law where courts evaluate grant programs as contracts 
and demonstrating that the contractual relationship between states/cities and the federal 
government is complicated by various consent procedures). 
 160. 34 U.S.C. § 10154 (2018); see, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 
230–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that the requirement that grantees comply with “all other 
applicable Federal laws” would supply sufficient notice to grantees subject to the “clear notice” 
rule).  
 161. New York, 951 F.3d at 105. When the Second Circuit contemplated whether the  
same language in the Byrne JAG statute—compliance with “all other applicable Federal laws” 
—provided sufficient notice to grantees, it held that there was “no Pennhurst concern” even 
though “notice was provided by the DOJ rather than Congress.” Id. at 110. For the court, 
Congress supplied the condition generally, and the DOJ selected an appropriate “applicable” 
federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1373). Id. at 110–11. 
 162. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 163. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan 
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 123 (referring to the relatedness prong as a “contentless 
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case of executive conditions is likely to draw some critics. In short, I argue that 
the Dole provisions, while analytically problematic, are a useful heuristic for 
balancing federal and state power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
interpreted the Spending Clause broadly, including as a vehicle for Congress 
to circumvent other limits on its power.164 The Court has also held, however, 
that the power to spend is not unlimited.165 If the power of Congress is not 
limited by the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8, then how should 
one think about the limits on its power? The federalism concerns with 
Spending Clause overreach can be separated into two general classifications: 
(1) fairness of contract and (2) accountability. 
In Pennhurst v. Halderman, the Supreme Court wrote that “legislation 
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: 
in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions.”166 The animating theory behind the contract model of federalism 
is that the federal government and the states are dual sovereigns, whose 
disputes should be refereed like disputes between two equally situated private 
citizens in a contract dispute. This contract theory has found strong support 
in the academic literature.167 The role of courts in contract disputes is to 
ensure that the elements of contract formation have been met, and then to 
 
restriction”); Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 356–80 (discussing problems with the Dole approach); 
Engstrom, supra note 27, at 1200–01; Baker & Berman, supra note 103, at 469–85 (analyzing why 
Dole creates problematic results). 
 164. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936) (arguing that “the [Spending] clause 
confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning 
by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to 
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general 
welfare of the United States”); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (“The 
reach of the Spending Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of 
Congress.” (emphasis added)), abrogated by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917–18 (1997) (making a distinction between 
“conditions upon the grant of federal fund[s]” and actual “mandates to the States” while 
discussing commandeering). 
 165. See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 66 (“But the adoption of the broader construction leaves the 
power to spend subject to limitations.”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
17 n.13 (1981) (“There are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States 
pursuant to its spending power.” (citations omitted)); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987) (“The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead subject to several general 
restrictions articulated in our cases.” (citation omitted)). 
 166. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
 167. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 158, at 500 (arguing that although spending conditions 
are “articulated in statutory form . . . [t]hey have no force at all as ‘law’”; rather, their only force 
is contractual, so they are not among the laws of the United States to which the Supremacy Clause 
applies (emphasis omitted)); Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 385 (arguing against the normative 
value of the contract analogy, but predicting its continued use in courts). See generally Fahey, supra 
note 158 (reviewing the doctrine of federalism by contract and discussing examples of problems 
with the doctrine); Fahey, supra note 159 (discussing the offer, acceptance, and meeting of the 
minds involved in federal grants-in-aid); Smith, supra note 27 (discussing the implications of the 
contract model for Chevron deference). 
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enforce performance unless the terms are deemed unconscionable or 
otherwise unacceptable for public policy reasons.168 In Spending Clause cases, 
courts do not hold parties to the same performance standards as private 
parties under the common law, but the general idea is that courts should  
defer to the terms of the contract and only intervene when the terms are 
extremely unfair.169 In addition, if the federalism concern is related to notice 
and foreseeability, then courts should not distinguish between spending 
conditions authored by Congress and those affixed by the Executive. As Peter 
J. Smith notes, “[a]n agency regulation provides a state with notice of its 
federal obligations just as effectively as a statute does.”170 
On the other hand, if the federalism concern about congressional 
spending is a lack of accountability, then conditions on spending should be 
enforced by courts in a way that ensures the electorate can trace them back to 
Congress. The animating theory behind the accountability model of spending 
power is the political safeguards of federalism.171 Because states are 
represented in Congress (e.g., each state has two Senators regardless of land 
or population), courts should worry less about states being victimized by 
Congress as opposed to agency heads, who are less accountable to both  
the states and to the general electorate. Thus, when Congress announces 
conditions directly, courts should worry less about whether states had proper 
notice or were coerced into service than whether the electorate understands 
the role of Congress in the spending scheme. When the Executive announces 
conditions on spending, however, courts should be more exacting in their 
inquiry into the nature of the conditions themselves vis-à-vis notice and 
coercion. 
A. PRAGMATIC HEURISTICS OF FEDERALISM 
Critics of Dole have generally argued that the decision underplays the 
importance of notice and foreseeability,172 and overplays the potential for 
 
 168. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 
§ 9.37 (6th ed. 2009). 
 169. Smith, supra note 27, at 1191 (noting that courts should intervene in “cases that involve 
obvious unfairness to the states”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (surveying 
the structure of federalism in the United States and its ability to promote accountability upon the 
separate branches). 
 172. See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 103, at 484 (“The conditional spending problem  
. . . involves the federal government’s conditioning the benefit of federal funds on an offeree 
state’s waiver of one of its sovereign prerogatives . . . . This is well known. And, equally well known 
is that Dole does not so much as nod to this fact.”); see also Fahey, supra note 158, at 2397 
(“Federalism is a dynamic system of layered and permeable governments that constantly 
negotiate how and through what complex array of institutions they will pursue the work of their 
constituents.”). 
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accountability.173 Recent scholarship challenges the accountability model 
because it is under-specified and thus poses a threat to Chevron because it cuts 
against judicial deference to executive decisions in the face of ambiguity.174 I 
do not discount the analytic critiques of the accountability model. Instead, I 
argue that the accountability model is relatively preferable to the contract 
model for parsing out a Spending Clause doctrine that distinguishes between 
conditions authored by the Executive versus Congress. 
The standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Dole are particularly 
constructive not because of their precision, but because they provide a 
channel for courts to confront the federalism concerns of the Spending 
Clause related to both the contract theory and the accountability theory.  
The requirement that conditions on federal spending be unambiguously 
announced prior to the receipt of funding speaks to the need for notice and 
a proper offer in the contract context, and to the clarity of source necessary 
to hold the author of the conditions accountable for the terms of the 
conditions. The requirement that conditions on federal spending be related 
to the purpose of the spending speaks to the foreseeability concerns under 
the contract model, and ensures that backlash against actions taken pursuant 
to the conditions will be properly targeted to those responsible. Finally, the 
concern about coercion speaks to contract formation under duress as well as 
direct accountability concerns of the anti-commandeering cases under the 
Tenth Amendment.175 
Above all, the Dole conditions are the culmination of 50 years of organic 
doctrinal evolution solidified in 1987 and cited hundreds of times since. As a 
result, despite their flaws, they are entitled to a measure of deference.176 
B. THREE WRINKLES OF SANCTUARY CITIES 
There are three distinct characteristics of the sanctuary cases that 
complicate a standard application of Dole. First, the Byrne JAG funds have 
been awarded since 2005 and both cities and counties have long incorporated 
these funds into their budgets and spent in reliance of their renewal. Adding 
 
 173. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 
NW. U. L. REV. 989 (2018) (empirically showing a lack of predicates for accountability in federal 
–state relations). 
 174. Smith, supra note 27, at 1190 (“[T]he accountability model upsets the delicate balance 
that Pennhurst achieved between federal and state interests and undermines the important values 
advanced by the Court’s decision in Chevron.”); Engstrom, supra note 27, at 1202 (“As a number 
of commentators have noted, the political accountability rationale is both under-specified and 
over-inclusive as a means of constraining federal power.”). 
 175. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“Where Congress encourages 
state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local 
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people. By contrast, where the 
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal 
officials is diminished.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997). 
 176. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
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conditions mid-stream raises the question of whether notice is even possible 
pre-award. Chief Justice Roberts has suggested that it is not. In NFIB v. Sebelius 
the Court grappled with whether Congress could condition ongoing Medicaid 
funding on compliance with a changed mandate. In his majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
As we have explained, “[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under 
the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising 
participating States with postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.” 
A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the 
right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program included the 
power to transform it so dramatically.177 
Justice Ginsburg countered Chief Justice Roberts’ framing of the issue 
with a formalist account of federal spending: 
Future Congresses are not bound by their predecessors’ dispositions; 
they have authority to spend federal revenue as they see fit. The 
Federal Government, therefore, is not, as The Chief Justice charges, 
threatening States with the loss of “existing” funds from one 
spending program in order to induce them to opt into another 
program. Congress is simply requiring States to do what States have 
long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with 
the conditions Congress prescribes for participation.178 
Because the issue was resolved on different grounds (see below), the 
question remains open whether conditions that are added to existing 
spending programs provide adequate notice, or whether they represent 
retroactive conditions that can only survive if they were foreseeable at the time 
Congress first appropriates the funding, if at all. (Though, it is worth noting 
that the Chief Justice was writing for the majority above). In NFIB v. Sebelius 
the Court ultimately sidestepped the unambiguous notice prong of Dole and 
instead held that the amount of money at stake was outcome determinative: 
Because Medicaid funding comprised approximately fifteen percent of the 
overall budget of states, Congress could not annul its federal contribution to 
the Medicaid funding all at once.179 Missing from the Court’s analysis was  
the fact that reneging already-existing funding programs itself increases the 
potential for coercion independent of the overall amount, particularly  
when federal spending is administered via reimbursements. Congress often 
provides for spending via reimbursement in order to protect against fraud 
 
 177. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 584 (2012) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)).  
 178. Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 179. See id. at 581–82 (majority opinion); see also Baker, supra note 107, at 78 (“The joint 
dissenters paid lip service to the other four requirements of the Dole test, but did not invoke any 
of them en route to invalidating the Medicaid expansion provision of the ACA.”).  
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and abuse. Because local jurisdictions first spend their own money in reliance 
on federal reimbursements, cutting these reimbursements could actually 
push a city or county into debt. As the Northern District of California wrote 
in its evaluation of E.O. 13,768: “A sudden and unanticipated cut mid-fiscal 
year would substantially increase the injury to the Counties by forcing them 
to make even more drastic cuts to absorb the loss of funds during a truncated 
period in order to stay on budget.”180 
A second feature of the sanctuary cases complicates a straight-forward 
Dole analysis: The vast majority of sanctuary jurisdictions are cities and 
counties.181 These sub-state units do not possess the same elevated sovereignty 
status afforded to states. On the one hand, courts might be more concerned 
about the coercive potential of federal grants in the absence of state-level 
political safeguards of federalism and thus side with the cities and counties.182 
On the other hand, sub-state jurisdictions are subject to higher governmental 
authorities and they lack the bargaining posture of states whose status is 
explicitly fortified by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, thus leading 
courts to potentially side with the federal government. The only lower court 
to address this issue in the sanctuary cases did so by noting that “[t]he federal 
government’s choice to pursue deportation on the basis of local criminal 
justice outcomes is something that cities and localities have no control over 
and presumably no input in.”183 
The third distinctive characteristic of the sanctuary cases is related. That 
is, sanctuary jurisdictions are by their very definition antagonistic toward 
immigration law. As the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. United States, “[t]he 
Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the 
subject of immigration and the status of aliens” and “[t]he federal power to 
determine immigration policy is well settled.”184 The field of immigration has 
thus been interpreted to be preempted in all cases by federal law.185 The 
Second Circuit recognized the implications of this preemption by noting  
that “[a]s the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, in the realm of 
 
 180. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 526–27 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania directly pointed to Philadelphia’s reliance on Byrne JAG funds 
to grant the City’s motion for preliminary injunction. See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280  
F. Supp. 3d 579, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“This Court finds that, given the long history of 
Philadelphia’s reliance on the annual receipt of Byrne JAG grants, and the absence of any 
evidence of abuse or misapplication, the preservation of the status quo is one substantial reason 
to grant the City’s motion for preliminary injunction.”). 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 182. Wechsler, supra note 171, at 545–46. 
 183. City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 632. 
 184. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394, 395 (2012). 
 185. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 441 (6th ed. 
2019). It is perhaps worth noting that the Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, identified 
law enforcement and public safety as quintessentially local issues into which federal authority 
should be limited. 
A4_SPENCER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2021  4:05 PM 
1244 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:1209 
immigration policy, it is the federal government that maintains ‘broad[]’  
and ‘preeminent[]’ power.”186 The Third Circuit flagged the issue but did not 
pass judgment: “Underlying this question, and potentially complicating its 
resolution, is the stark contrast in the priorities of the City and those of the 
Executive Branch regarding immigration policy. In resolving the discrete 
legal question before us, however, we make no judgment as to the merits of 
this policy dispute.”187 
These three distinguishing characteristics cut in opposite directions—the 
ongoing nature of the Byrne JAG funds likely favors cities and counties, the 
subject matter of immigration law favors the Executive, and the local nature 
of the suits could favor either side depending on one’s view of federalism. The 
upshot is that any application of Dole in the sanctuary cases is likely to be 
complicated, and the ultimate disposition of these cases may be decided on 
grounds other than the Spending Clause. Nevertheless, the blunt nature of 
E.O. 13,768 and the retroactive character of the new Byrne JAG conditions 
highlight important constitutional questions that remain open. Repeated 
threats by President Trump to withhold federal grants for political reasons are 
likely to keep these questions in the foreground. 
V. A RIGID EXECUTIVE DOLE TEST 
Executive conditional spending should be subject to a “rigid-Dole” test. 
Before detailing the specific contours of this test, a discussion of several 
justifications for its establishment is in order. There is an array of arguments 
to support the establishment of a rigid-Dole test, including the desire to 
provide courts with a consistent doctrinal framework and considerations 
related to the distinct powers of the Executive branch. Further, a rigid-Dole 
test would mitigate federalism concerns by protecting traditional state powers 
and limiting federal cost-shifting; concerns that are exacerbated in the 
context of immigration. 
First, there is the need for a single, clear framework by which to judge 
executive conditional spending. A rigid-Dole test would afford a degree of 
consistency and predictability to parties in legal proceedings, and to the 
courts themselves. (Admittedly, applying the traditional Dole test could 
achieve the same end). As described in Section III.C, district courts that have 
evaluated the Byrne JAG cases have addressed myriad arguments and 
doctrines including anticommandeering, separation of powers, and arbitrary 
and capriciousness agency action, as well as the conditional spending 
doctrine. Although other arguments may still be raised by parties, a single, 
prevailing test would focus the issues and narrow a court’s analysis. 
 
 186. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2020) (first quoting Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012); and then quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 
(1982)). 
 187. City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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Relatedly, the need for this framework will become very clear in cases 
involving executive conditions when Congress has delegated conditional 
spending power. The decisions of the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
struck down the Attorney General’s conditions in the cases before them 
because Congress had not delegated this power, and it remains unclear how 
they would approach a substantive analysis of the conditions themselves if 
delegation were present. 
The importance of a rigid-Dole test is heightened when Congress 
unambiguously delegates the authority to add conditions on federal spending 
because other bases for challenging the constitutionality of executive 
conditions may lose force. For example, as previously noted, the Supreme 
Court has stated that the anti-commandeering doctrine is not applicable  
in the context of conditional spending.188 Further, an impoundment 
argument—that the Executive withheld funds duly apportioned by 
Congress—would also be unsuccessful when Congress has expressly delegated 
this power. Although the Supreme Court has held that “legislative intention, 
without more, is” insufficient to confer on the Executive discretion in 
distributing apportioned funds, an outright delegation of conditional 
spending power would likely survive such a challenge.189 A rigid-Dole test 
would be an important tool in such cases. 
Another justification for an executive Dole test is that the Executive, in 
many situations, can act more quickly than Congress, and with more 
individualized power, especially in the context of executive orders. Therefore, 
the Executive should be subject, at a minimum, to the same standards of 
constitutional limits as Congress when enacting or enforcing conditions on 
federal funds. Although a President’s executive order can likely not impose 
such conditions directly, at least without a delegation of such power, it  
can quickly influence and guide executive agency actions, as evidenced by 
Executive Order 13,768 and the subsequent Byrne JAG conditions. A rigid-
Dole test would restrain this type of executive chain reaction. 
Further, the unique functions of the Executive, especially the Office of 
the White House, should not be reason to absolve it of complying with the 
principles of Dole. As an analogue, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court 
stated that although senior White House aides may be tasked with “the 
unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest,” the 
Court rejected “a ‘special functions’ rationale” as a basis for affording these 
members of the Executive special treatment.190 A similar conclusion 
—rejecting a special function rationale—could be made in the context of 
conditional spending, especially, as in the current case of sanctuary cities, 
 
 188. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916–18 (1997). 
 189. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44–46 (1975). 
 190. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811–12 (1982) (rejecting the special treatment of 
affording presidential aides a blanket, absolute immunity). 
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when the Executive frames the issue as one of national security.191 The need 
for a rigid-Dole test is likely at its height during an emergency or other threat 
to national security. In these cases, a court is likely to apply Youngstown to any 
presidential actions undertaken in the course of an emergency. Because the 
conditional spending power can only be delegated to the Executive, the 
Executive’s authority will always be at its highest peak under Youngstown.192 
This inter-branch coordination potentially exacerbates the risk of federal 
overreach (two branches against state and local jurisdictions instead of one) 
and so a rigid-Dole test is all the more appropriate when the Executive adds 
conditions to federal outlays in the name of national security. 
Finally, the Executive has potential incentives to reward or punish 
specific jurisdictions in a way that Congress, when considered as a single 
entity, does not. Specifically, electoral battleground states receive seven 
percent more federal funding than spectator states193 and the allocation of 
federal funds more generally has been found to be driven by a President’s 
political interests.194 A sitting President, especially one in his or her first term, 
thus has the incentive to reward battleground states with lenient conditions 
on federal funds and to punish spectator states and their local jurisdictions by 
imposing stricter conditions. Even if the Executive acted in a way that was not 
meant to directly punish a spectator state, the Executive may be less inclined 
to revise conditions in the face of complaints from such states. It is unlikely 
that a single grant program could be custom-tailored with different conditions 
for different states, but generally applicable programs and rules are not always 
felt equally, and the President may be incentivized to take advantage of this. 
It should be noted that the sanctuary cities of San Francisco, Seattle, Chicago, 
and New York City are located in non-battleground states, but all of them vote 
heavily Democratic and are far more liberal than the national average.195 It is 
unlikely that President Trump and the Department of Justice would have 
engaged in punitive executive conditional spending to effectuate immigration 
policy if a majority of sanctuary cities were located in battleground states or 
staunchly Republican states. 
 
 191. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United 
States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 192. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (outlining three categories of presidential power, which are defined by an action’s 
“disjunction or conjunction with” the will of Congress). 
 193. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR 
VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation [https://perma.cc/8WXS-
UGBZ]. 
 194. See JOHN HUDAK, PRESIDENTIAL PORK: WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE OVER THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF FEDERAL GRANTS 20–21 (2014). 
 195. The City of Philadelphia, another more Democratic city is located in the battleground 
state of Pennsylvania. See A Recent Voting History of the 15 Battleground States, NAT’L CONST. CTR. 
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/voting-history-of-the-15-battleground-states 
[https://perma.cc/3AR5-JQET]. 
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A. CONTOURS OF THE TEST 
The foundation of the rigid-Dole test is provided by the standards 
articulated in South Dakota v. Dole. My proposal is relatively modest, addressing 
only those conditions issued in the wake of an unambiguous delegation from 
Congress. There is some tension between a requirement for delegatory clarity 
and Chevron,196 but to be clear, there need not be clarity from Congress on the 
conditions to be imposed, only on the fact that authority to add conditions 
has been delegated. In practice, this predicate is perhaps more significant 
than the actual test that I propose; however, limiting the test to clear 
delegations significantly narrows the scope of my argument since I simply 
argue that a rigid-Dole test applies only when Congress has unambiguously 
delegated authority to add conditions on federal spending. A rigid-Dole test 
modifies three of the primary inquiries under South Dakota v. Dole. 
1. Strict Clarity 
Under the ambiguousness inquiry in a rigid-Dole test, a strict clarity 
standard is needed. This heightened level of clarity is similar to that advocated 
by Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion in Cedar Rapids Community School District 
v. Garrett.197 Additionally, as detailed above, a primary source of judicial 
confusion in the Byrne JAG cases has been the interplay of both Congress and 
the Executive, which the current conditional spending doctrine does not 
easily accommodate. The intervention of the rigid test in this area is clear: 
The conditions themselves are to be the focus of the ambiguity inquiry, and 
not language in the authorizing statute. Congressional delegation and 
executive authority to impose conditions would not be intertwined in a rigid-
Dole test. Each would stand separate as other bases for challenging executive 
conditional spending. 
Under the strict clarity standard, it is not only important that the 
language of a condition be clear, but also that the timing of the presentation 
of a condition provide sufficient notice. In other words, courts should 
evaluate the ambiguity of conditions at the stage of grant solicitation. 
Detailing conditions in a grant program’s solicitation materials would allow a 
state or local jurisdiction a sufficient opportunity to weigh its options in 
deciding whether to apply for or accept a federal grant. This is not to say that 
grants could not be modified in future award years. Under the rigid-Dole test, 
however, notifying a jurisdiction of conditions in a grant’s award letter, or in 
official proclamations after a grant has been accepted, would be inadequate. 
 
 196. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 27, at 1188–89; Engstrom, supra note 27, at 1211–22. 
 197. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett, 526 U.S. 66, 84 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“It follows that we must interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly, in order to avoid 
saddling the States with obligations that they did not anticipate.”). 
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2. Substantially Related 
A rigid-Dole test requires that a condition be substantially related to the 
underlying grant program. In part, this modification has a practical rationale: 
Grants under the control of an executive agency will almost always be 
somewhat related to the agency’s area of control, or else the grants would 
likely not have been assigned to that agency, and the substance of any imposed 
condition would likely be one related to an agency’s zone of regulation. 
Therefore, executive-issued conditions should be closely scrutinized by courts 
to ensure that what the conditions require of a jurisdiction are closely aligned 
with the purpose of the grant program to which it is attached, not simply that 
the condition and the grant program could be categorized under the same 
general area of regulation. In practice, courts would evaluate the substance of 
executive conditions against the stated goals of the authorizing statute and 
the stated goals of the Executive for the conditions. The judicial inquiry  
would focus on the purpose of the grant itself and not the purpose of the 
implementing agency. For example, if a court determines that the conditions 
on Byrne JAG funding are related to immigration, then the court would ask 
whether the Byrne JAG funds were appropriated and distributed with an eye 
on immigration. The Executive could not remedy an adverse judicial holding 
by merely transferring implementing authority over the Byrne JAG funds from 
the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.  
3. Coercion as Commandeering 
Under the more traditional Dole framework, courts inquire whether 
impermissible financial inducement has occurred by looking at the 
percentage of a state’s budget for which the conditioned federal funding 
accounts.198 In the rigid-Dole test, coercion would not be determined by the 
size of the grant in question, but by the nature of the mandate. The coercion 
prong in Dole is subjective, arbitrary, and ultimately subject to the Sorites 
paradox.199 Thus, while the Supreme Court has permitted Congress to 
sidestep anti-commandeering limits under the Spending Clause, the rigid-
Dole test would close this loophole. A condition on spending would be 
considered coercive if the condition mandated action that would otherwise 
be beyond the purview of the federal government, whether enumerated in 
Articles I and II, or protected under the Tenth Amendment. Questions about 
the amount of funds at stake, the reliance interests of states, and the risk of 
 
 198. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (holding that 
placing conditions on grants that comprise approximately twenty percent of the average state’s 
overall budget was coercive). In Dole, the Court framed the amount of money at issue as the 
percentage of the state’s highway budget (five percent), but in NFIB, the Court also referred to 
the amount that had been at issue in Dole as a percentage of the state’s overall budget (less than 
half of one percent). Id. 
 199. See Baker & Berman, supra note 103, at 485 (referring to the coercion prong of Dole as 
“at best, ill-suited for judicial administration and, at worst, incoherent”). 
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“policy lock-in” would be irrelevant in a judicial proceeding; these concerns 
would be limited to political remedies. A rigid-Dole test would replace an 
arbitrary functional inquiry with a more formal categorical examination. 
B. AS APPLIED TO SANCTUARY CITIES 
Illustrative applications of the rigid-Dole test are in order. The federal 
cases discussed in earlier sections grappled with two executive actions, 
Executive Order 13,768 and the Byrne JAG conditions. We begin with an 
analysis of the Byrne JAG conditions of “notice,” “access,” and “Section 1373 
compliance.”200 Under the ambiguousness prong of the rigid-Dole test, the 
three conditions all contain language that is quite clear and unambiguous. 
However, the conditions likely do not satisfy the strict clarity rule because their 
presentation did not appear in Byrne JAG solicitation materials, but in award 
letters instead.201 As a result, jurisdictions lacked the ability to decide whether 
to apply for, or accept, a Byrne JAG grant since the funds had already been 
awarded and the conditions applied retroactively. Identical conditions would 
survive a rigid-Dole inquiry in future years if they are unambiguously 
presented to states prior to their application for the funds. 
Although the conditions on Byrne JAG funds would likely be held 
uncoercive under a traditional Dole analysis (inasmuch as they represent a 
fraction of state and local budgets), the Executive would face a tougher 
challenge under a rigid-Dole test. The conditions on Byrne JAG funds require 
state and local law enforcement officers to implement and enforce federal law 
in the absence of federal law enforcement. This relationship is the textbook 
definition of commandeering and would be coercive under the stricter test.202 
The fact that Byrne JAG grants have been awarded to many jurisdictions for 
more than a decade and that there are strong reliance interests should have 
no bearing on the outcome. The nature of the condition is itself coercive and 
would not be constitutional if directly mandated. 
Finally, under the relatedness prong of the rigid-Dole test, courts are 
unlikely to determine that the executive conditions on Byrne JAG funds are 
substantially related to the underlying purpose of the grant (which is to 
provide states, counties, and cities with flexibility to respond to changing  
law enforcement needs as identified by the state and local jurisdictions 
themselves).203 Every trial court that has considered the nexus between the 
Byrne JAG program and the Attorney General’s recently-added conditions 
has, to date, found that the conditions are not sufficiently related to the 
 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 115–18; see, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 F. Supp. 
3d 748, 752–54 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff’d and remanded, 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 201. See City of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part sub nom. City of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020), petition 
for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W. 3172 (U.S. Nov. 19, 2020) (No. 20-666). 
 202. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
 203. See NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, supra note 13, at 1. 
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program’s goals. Some of these courts have applied the kind of narrow inquiry 
into the relatedness of grant conditions that is beyond the traditional Dole test 
and more like the rigid-Dole test that I proposed here.204 The Byrne JAG 
program is intended to support state and local criminal justice institutions 
—the top five areas of expenditures in 2016 were: drug, gang, and other task 
force operations and personnel; law enforcement equipment; prosecution 
and indigent defense initiatives; corrections and community corrections; and 
crime prevention programs.205 Under the narrow inquiry required by the  
rigid test, these areas of criminal justice are not substantially related to the 
conditions, which speak to immigration enforcement. Simply categorizing 
them under the same theme of law enforcement is insufficient. Thus, under 
a rigid-Dole test, the conditions announced by the Attorney General on Byrne 
JAG funds would likely fail under each prong and thus be held unconstitutional. 
Executive Order 13,768 would similarly fail a rigid-Dole test on the 
grounds that it is coercive and not substantially related to the goals of the 
targeted funding. However, E.O. 13,768 would likely survive a challenge 
under the strict clarity rule because the language is clear, specific, and 
announced prior to the solicitation of funds. E.O. 13,768 is exceptionally 
clear in what is required of jurisdictions: compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.206 
Section 1373 prohibits states from limiting the voluntary sending, and 
receiving, of immigration and citizenship information to and from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.207 Further, the Executive Order is 
exceedingly clear that non-compliance will render a jurisdiction “not eligible 
to receive Federal grants,” an announcement made prior to any solicitation 
or award of these grants.208 However, E.O. 13,768 conditions all federal funds 
upon immigration compliance,209 meaning the relationship between the 
conditions and the funding is tenuous (or non-existent) for the overwhelming 
majority of grant programs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that executive conditions on federal 
spending are entirely appropriate, but only when Congress has 
unambiguously delegated the authority to add conditions. I have further 
argued that executive conditions on federal spending should be subject to a 
rigid-Dole analysis by courts. Because the central constitutional concern in 
Spending Clause cases is the undue aggrandizement of federal power, inter-
 
 204. See City of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 958–62; City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 
F. Supp. 3d 579, 639–44 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 205. Looking at the Data: How States Invest Byrne JAG, supra note 113. 
 206. Exec. Order No. 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).  
 207. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018). 
 208. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.  
 209. Id. 
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branch coordination poses a greater threat to state sovereignty than either 
Congress or the Executive acting alone. A rigid-Dole test mitigates against 
several risks of executive conditional spending, namely those related to cost-
shifting by the federal government. The upshot of a rigid-Dole test is that 
conditions on federal spending will likely shift away from the Executive to 
Congress, which is desirable on accountability grounds. 
A recent Second Circuit opinion upholding the Attorney General’s 
conditions on federal grants to sanctuary jurisdictions runs counter to 
holdings by the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, increasing the 
likelihood that the Supreme Court will soon wade into this hotly contested 
cross-section of divisive issues: national immigration policy, immigration 
enforcement, the clash of national and local sovereignty, and the unbridled 
power of the administrative state. The controversy over sua sponte executive 
conditions on federal grants poses a ripe opportunity for a Court wary of the 
regulatory state to rethink the spending power of Congress so as to ultimately 
rein in the Executive. 
 
